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Emerson lectric's 
Chuck Knight and team 
Effici ncy i n't verything, 
it' the only thing 

Emerson Electric: Efficiency 
Isn't J\ Goal; -l's J\ Religion 
A rare closeup look at one of the most 
successful companies in the U.S., at the 
man who built it and his handpicked heir. 
By PHYLLIS BERMAN 
with Richard Greene 
THIS IS a story about an impressive com-
pany, but, u1?derneath , it is the story of 
three tough, driven men and how they 
interaCted. Wallace R. (Buck) Persons , 
68, is a former football coach and electri-
cal engineer who left Lincoln Electric to 
head Emerson Electric Co. in the early 
Fifties when it had sales of just $45 mil-
lion and was in deep trouble . The second 
character is Charles F . (Chuck) Knight, a 
lean, handsome man of 42 who took over 
Persons' job at age 37. And final ly we 
have Chuck Knight's father, Lester, 72 , 
owner of the international consulting 
firm that bears his name. The elder 
Knight, who never actually worked for 
Emerson , nevertheless played an impor-
tant role in its growth. The action and 
interaction of the three men on each 
other explains a good part of the success 
that has built Emerson Electric into a 
$1.8-billion company whose growth and 
profitability are the envy of U.S. 
industry. 
St. Louis-based Emerson is a truly 
unusual outfit. It r.emains a growth com-
pany in a time when few large companies 
can still claim the title. Lay a ruler on a 
chart of Emerson's earnings per share 
running back to 1957: a few peaks but no 
outstanding dips , and by and large the 
line ascends smoothly at an almost mo-
notonously steady rate-not only year by 
year but quarter by quarter. It is almost 
too good to be true. Only it is true. In 
the fiscal year that ended last Septem-
ber, Emerson earned $2.47 a share on 
sales of $1.8 billion. That was a gain of 
21 % in profits and 19% in sales. For 
Emerson it was h.ardly an extraordinary 
year. In the first quarter of fiscal 1978, 
earnings per share were ahead 19.6% 
and sales 22.3%, 
Here is a company with a relentless , 
almost heartless devotion to the true bot-
tom line: return on inves~ment . Buck 
Persons has been compared to the late 
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Vince Lombardi. Emerson's motto, to 
paraphrase Lombardi, might well be: Ef-
ficiency isn't everything; it is the only 
thing. Here is a company that does not 
hesitate to throttle back sales growth in 
the interests of a higher re turn on cap-
ital. Control, discipline, tough-minded 
decision-making are hallmarks of Emer-
son. And the payoff is a five-year average 
return on capital of 17. 7% that placed 
Emerson well up in the ranks of large 
manufacturing companies in FORBES' 
Annual Report on American Industry. 
It takes an extraordinarily driven man 
to maintain this kind of momentum, and 
Chuck Knight is driven indeed . How did 
he get that way? What makes Chuck 
Knight run? FORBES asked him. He re-
called the summer his father drove him 
to Orillia, Canada to work in a foundry 
Controlled Energy: The ~verwhe lniing. impres~ion Chuck Knight gives · 
is of controlled energy-taut and ready to spring. 
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owned by one of Lester Knight's clients . 
"Everything that happened to me that 
summer is as vivid as if it happened 
yesterday," he recalls . "I simply wasn't 
prepared for the experience. Not social-
ly, not workwise, not in any way. The 
fact that I survived that summer has 
always been a miracle to me. It has 
structured my personality, given me the 
confidence to take on anything." Sink or 
swim. Somehow, the adolescent swam. 
Chuck Knight pauses for a minute: "I 
always thought the old man was lucky 
that something didn't happen to me 
when I was up there." Knight's teenage 
years were filled with more of the 
same--summers spent working in Ar-
gentina, Switzerland-but that summer 
of his 16th year in Canada was his bap-
tism by fire. 
What the elder Knight apparently 
failed to consider, however, was that 
once his son was self-sufficient, that in-
dependence would affect him as well. At 
21 Chuck Knight decided to marry 
Joanne Parrish, who is the mother of his 
four children. The elder Knight was op-
posed to the early marriage. Chuck went 
ahead and got married and supported his 
young family while he was in Cornell 
University's business school by coaching 
freshman football , teaching plumbing at 
Cornell's hotel school and graphics at the 
engineering school. 
After graduation , 24-year-old Knight 
went to Zurich to oversee Lester B. 
Knight's European operations . Even 
then, however, the elder Knight didn 't le t 
up on his son. In 1963, after he had been in 
Europe for four years, Chuck got a cable 
from his father: "Be in St. Louis Monday 
morning or you're off the payroll ." 
That same Monday, Knight reported 
to his first U.S. client: Emerson Electric. 
Over the next dozen years he would 
spend over one-fourth of his time con-
sulting for Emerson and Buck Persons, 
who was already something of an indus-
trial legend. Arriving at Emerson in 
1954, Persons had moved it from a prob-
lem-ridden maker of understyled, over-
engineered fans into a company able to 
compete with General Electric. 
Persons redesigned the fans and then 
the whole company-with the help of 
consultant Lester B. Knight and others. 
He set in place an elaborate planning 
system. "I was a hands-on manager, in 
every de tail, " Persons recalls. "He ran a 
one-man show," says E . Lawrence 
(Larry) Keyes, now Emerson's 
president. 
By the early 1970s Buck Persons had 
built a big company, but he had one big 
problem : succession. Says Keyes, his ad-
ministrative assistant for five years, 
"That problem consumed him ."" With 
the help of Lester B. Knight & Associ-
ates, Persons reviewed 150 potential 
candidates over a two-year period . The 
final choice: Chuck Knight himself. 
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Why not? Knight knew the company 
intimately at the highest level. He'd 
been on the board of its largest division , 
Emerson Motor Division, an electrical 
motor manufacturer, for over four years. 
He was eminently qualified in every re-
spect: forceful , intelligent, handsome, 
with an impeccable background-like 
Persons himself, an avid wildlife hunter 
and football player-a Cornell M.B.A., 
management and engineering consultant 
for such U.S. companies as Caterpillar 
Tractor and Standard Oil of Indiana. 
At first Chuck Knight turned down the 
offer. The problem was that Lester 
Knight had sold his company to his son 
five years before. How could Chuck 
over. Lester and I are great chums; we 
even play golf toge ther." 
Having stood up to his own father, 
Knight now had another strong, talent-
ed older man to deal with . It wasn't 
an easy situation. "Chuck accepted the 
fact that we didn 't want somebody to 
come in here and overhaul Emerson's 
whole management system," says Per-
sons. "Improve it, that's okay, but not 
say, as many of the potential candi-
dates did: Tl! come in for six months 
and then I'll let you know what rm 
·going to do.' " 
"I didn't revolutionize,'' admits Chuck 
Knight. 'Tm sure that's one of the rea-
sons I was chosen." Yet Knight is ambiv-
Forceful Persons: Buck Persons was strong enough and clever enough to make 
Emerson run like a Swiss watch. He found a successor w ho promises to do the same. 
Knight abandon his own business to 
work for somebody else? 
But in time Knight realized that Em-
erson was an opportunity he couldn't 
pass up. In 1973, at 37, he became 
Emerson's president, and the following 
year its CEO. Says Knight, "My father 
was nice enough to leave an opening for 
me to come back to the business within 
three years ." 
That deadline has long passed. Lester 
Knight created the perfect manager. 
Buck Persons took him away. 
Lester Knight was bitter, says Per-
sons. "It really was rough at first . Lester 
went around tell ing anyone who would 
listen to him that I had really turned the 
tables on him . But today it has blown 
alent on that point. He gives full credit 
to Buck Persons but wants no mistake 
made about his own contributions: evo-
lutionary, if not revolutionary, changes 
in the company's basic planning system 
as well as more substan tial changes in its 
international operations and a reposi-
tioning of its basic business in the U.S. 
More than that, he brought to the com-
pany the energy a young man can bring 
to his job, the kind of drive that had been 
missing in Persons' last years. 
Chuck Knight's greatest contribution 
to the company is his cool, rational mind, 
his ability to anticipate problems lurking 
in the corporate woodwork. Today 
Knight spends half of his time on corpo-
rate planning; he attends almost all the 
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divisional planning conferences of Emer-
son's 42 profit centers. 
Emerson's planning sessions are 
among the most sophisticated in U.S. 
industry. The planning is done within a 
broad strategical framework that calls for 
doubling earnings every six years, which 
is an average of 12.5% earnings gain 
every year; no more than 10% of rev-
enues from defense; no more than 20% 
to 25% from international; and $200-mil-
lion worth of new products to be devel-
oped through corporate research and de-
velopment by 1980. 
Knight's attention to detail would do 
credit to Harold Geneen. Each division 
is required to complete fat planning 
buy that. He said the market would be 
growing at the rate of 4%." So Browning 
had a problem. 
Like every division president, he is 
expected to come up with substantial 
growth each year, no matter how slowly 
his base market expands. This year 
Browning's target is 15% growth. "We 
don't plan like GE," says William Rut-
ledge, vice chairman of the board, and a 
former GE employee. "There's no such 
thing as harvesting a business around 
here." In short, Bob Browning couldn't 
just say: "Be happy, Chuck, with the 
profits we are already throwing off." That 
is no response at all at Emerson . Failing 
to meet the 15% goal could jeopardize 
Father & Son: In 1966 a youthful Chuck Knight (left) was Number Two 
in dad's company. He left to be Number One elsewhere. 
books detailing every one of its prod-
ucts-its sales, profits , market possibili-
ties and growth opportunities. 
Browning Corp. is one of the 42 profit 
centers, a 92-year-old industry leader in 
mechanical power transmission equip-
ment like speed reducers, gears and belt 
drives. Last January Knight was in its 
Spartan offices (which sit in the shadow 
of the Appalachians in tiny Maysville, 
Ky.) for the most important of about 25 
meetings in which executives of each 
division participate throughout the year. 
"Chuck and I were trying to thrash out 
how fast we could expect our markets to 
grow, " says Bob Browning, president of 
Browning Corp. "I estimated they'd 
grow about 2.6% next year. Chuck didn't 
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Bob Browning's incentive payment-
which can be more than two-thirds of his 
base salary. 
It is not unusual for men like John 
Burge, president of Emerson's Electron-
ics and Space Division , or Bob Browning 
of Browning Corp. to earn 70% of the.ir 
base salary as an additional incentive 
payment. Both did so last year. Lower 
down in the corporate structure the sys-
tem works the same way. One young 
executive in Burge's division last year 
earned a base salary of$48,000; on top of 
that he got another $33,000 bonus. 
But how do you get a 15% sales gain 
out of a 4% market growth? Browning 
can count on an additional 6% growth by · 
price increases, but that is still only 10% 
growth, 5% short of his goal. The short-
fall is what the company calls the gap, 
and Bob Browning must present a choice 
of "gap fillers" to Knight. Among Brown-
ing's gap fillers this year: the addition of 
over ten salesmen, a new distribution 
warehouse in the South and an extension 
of one product line-enclosed gears for 
high-str~ss machinery. 
Browning's specific problems are, in 
essence, the same as those of the parent 
company. Nearly 70% of Emerson's rev-
enues are derived from its domestic core 
businesses which are in mature indus-
tries; in fact, the average growth of 
Emerson's core from 1965 to 1975 was 
only 7.9%. To keep the company grow-
ing faster than that, it is Bob Browning's 
job to gain market share by capitalizing 
on his competitors' weaknesses or identi-
fying new market niches where he can 
compete profitably. 
Even such rigorous advance planning 
doesn't fill all the holes, however. In 
which case, Emerson resorts to its well-
known contingency planning-ABC 
budgeting-which forces divisions to 
· make and stick to prearranged budgets 
in case sales droop (see box , p . 44). That 
kind of discipline helped Emerson 
through the last recession even though 
all contingency plans were thrown out 
the window. In fact, by gearing the 
whole company toward 8% aftertax profit 
margin, Emerson actually got a 4% in-
crease in profit on a l % dip in sales in the 
recession of 1975. 
There are many Persons' policies 
Knight has not changed. For example, 
there is still a strong emphasis on keep-
ing plants small, decentralized and -non-
union. Today Emerson has 95 domestic 
plants-mainly in rural areas (not just in 
the South but across the U.S.)-usually 
with fewer than 1,000 employees and 
81 % of them nonunion. 
This clear preference for establishing 
plants out of northern urban areas was 
once called Persons' "Southern Strate-
gy. " This is a touchy subject with Knight 
because it implies that Emerson has the 
cheapest labor in its markets. That's not 
the explanation for the company's prefer-
ence for smallish plants in small southern 
towns. Costs are lower there and it's 
easier to keep the unions out. 
"It became apparent that certain prod-
ucts were just never going to compete in 
a community like St. Louis," says Per-
sons. "So we eventually got all our com-
mercial products out into the South and 
left highly technical things in the shop in 
St. Louis." Jack C. Rohrbaugh, Emer-
son's vice president for labor relations, 
says: "We knock unions and we knock 
them ha.rd, because they're cheating on 
us. They come in and promise the moon. 
One of their favorite ploys is to talk about 
job security. And we say, 'Well, let's 
look at where the UAW has been on the 
scene.' Look at our USEM [electrical 
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The ABC's Of Budgeting 
EVEN Emerson Electric Co.' s meticulously made plans 
occasionally go awry. Last year it looked as if three divisions 
weren't going to make their growth targets . Enter Emer-
son's renowned "ABC" budgeting system. 
Less than Holy Writ, perhaps, but far more than a 
gimmick, the ABC system's simply a way of forcing divi-
sions to make contingency plans in case sales slip from 
projections. Divisions all start the budget year on "A" 
budgets and, if they remain on course, stay there. If there 
are signs of sales slipping up to 10%, a "B" budget is 
introduced, calculated to cut expenses enough to meet the 
original profit objectives on lower sales. If a division is in 
real trouble, the "C" budget is brought in, drastic pruning 
takes place and efforts are made to optimi~e profits. 
year 1977 the slump in nonresidential construction com-
bined with the energy crunch to cripple the division. By 
January 1977 division President James Ramsey could see 
trouble ahead. Sales, originally budgeted for about $50 
million, were already off 5% from plan. In April the "C" 
budget, made final in July 1976, was brought in. 
Daybright needed cost reductions of at least $1 million . 
Last year Emerson's commercial lighting division , Day-
bright, was subjected to the rigors of a "C" budget. In fiscal 
The division closed its 45,000-square-foot plant in St. Louis, 
which made hospital lighting and exit signs, and its assem-
bly operation in Sunnyvale, Calif., which made standard 
lighting fIXtures. Both were consolidated into a Tupelo, 
Miss. operation. Daybright also dropped over 100 unprofit-
able items. These moves resulted in the loss of 250 jobs in 
St. Louis and anoth~r 40 in Sunnyvale. Net results : over $1 
million in cost reductions and a repostured company. 
-R.G. 
motors] plant at Milford, Conn. that was 
unionized. Because of a runaway incen-
tive program they were getting their 
money with half a day's labor. And we 
couldn't live with that. The plant just 
priced itself out of the market. So, we 
just dispersed its operations to other 
plants." He adds quickly: "Okay, if 
there's a threat in that, so be it. But we 
don't close down plants because they're 
union. " 
Much as the unions object to Emer-
son's policies, they have not been able to 
pin any serious charges on the company. 
Of 48 union elections at Emerson plants 
in the last ten years, there have been 
only five objections by unions, of which 
only one has been upheld. Almost all 
unionized plants are those that were ac-
quired. According to H .P. Smith of Kid-
der, Peabody, Emerson's wage costs are 
13% below the rest of the industry and a 
full 16% below competitors like GE and 
Westinghouse. This is a major factor in 
Emerson's ability to compete profitably 
with those far bigger outfits. 
Under Persons, virtually all new prod-
uct development came either directly 
from divisions' coffers or through a cap-
tive venture capital company: Unfortu-
nately, few products were produced that 
way. But Knight came up with a program 
to fund new developments .with corpo-
rate money. One result was the low-
priced Beaird-Poulan chain saw. Beaird-
Poulan was an acquisition, a small maker 
of chain saws that lacked a full product 
line. The corporate money, $6.5 million 
of it, produced a $79.95 machine that 
made the new division fully competitive 
and pushed its market share from under 
17% to 24% in consumer chain saws. 
Knight also put more emphasis on a 
management development program. 
Persons simply waited for talented 
young men to "bubble up" to the top. 
Like everything else that Knight does, 
spotting new talent is a coldly efficient 
procedure. More than 500 corporate and 
division staff members are continually 
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rated on a color-coding 'system which 
measures potential and performance in 
their present job. · Lucky "double 
greens" get a go-ahead on both counts, 
which means they'll be invited to St. 
Louis to meet and dine with Chuck 
Knight. At the bottom are "red-red, 
which means dead-dead," says Knight. 
One area where Knight has made a 
particular mark is in international oper-
ations. "Persons was apprehensive about 
the international market," says Larry 
Keyes . Knight, having started his profes-
sional career in Europe, fe lt differently. 
One of his first moves was to replace the 
former vice president for international 
operations. He made every divisional 
president accountable for the products 
he marketed abroad . In 13 countries in 
1973, today Emerson sells its products in 
double that number of countries. Knight 
has targeted $500 million from interna-
tional sales by 1980. "And that's a chick-
en target," he says . Chicken target? 
While he has pushed Emerson further 
into the international arena, like Per-
sons, Knight is averse to exposing Emer-
son to serious risks overseas . Whenever 
possible, he has tried to limit his expo-
sure abroad by exporting U.S. manufac-
tured goods. "If we had to close any one 
of our 97 footings abroad [a footing is 
anything from a single salesman to a full 
manufacturing facility], the auditors 
wouldn't even make us put it in the 
annual report as a footnote," says 
Knight. "But the gut question is when 
we'll have to take more risk and invest 
more_ abroad. As far as I can tell, that 
won't happen until we reach $750 mil-
lion in international sales ." That gives 
Knight a good five years . 
Knight faces some of the same risk in 
his defense business. Emerson was badly 
burned in 1969 when the government 
canceled its Cheyenne helicopter pro-
gram, knocking out $75 million in sales 
in one day. 
The lesson has not been forgotten. 
After exploring the possibility of selling 
off all defense operations, it was finally 
decided that diversification would give 
the company some degree of safety. To-
day defense operations are spread over 
40 major programs including the TOW 
missile, an antitank weapon system; the 
F-5 radar system , which is a family of fire 
control radar instruments; and naval 
twin-gun mounts for intercoastal type 
defense craft. 
John Burge, president of defense op-
erations, says candidly: "Sure we wor-
ried about Carter's stand on the sales of 
foreign arms. So we had a team of ten 
people in Washington-and what they 
concluded is that Carter would push de-
fensive weapons like our TOW missile 
launcher and he did just that." 
Every growth company eventually set" 
ties into middle age. Seventy percent of 
Emerson's U.S. domestic commercial 
operations are in mature industries. 
How do you get 15% growth a year out of 
a company with that much in mature 
business? Answer: by pushing the com-
pany into new areas-specifically utility 
distribution, electrical connectors , pro-
cess control and telecommunications. 
Knight identified these areas as strate-
gic, and he's already gotten a base in 
three of them with the purchase of $41-
million Rosemount in 1976, $118-million 
A.B. Chance in 1975 and a recent offer 
for Avantek. Knight is banking on these 
acquisitions to reposition his core busi-
ness. Over the next five to seven years, 
he aims to flesh out these faster-growing 
new areas. 
But future acquisitions may be more of 
a problem. For years, Wall Street recog-
nized Emerson's unique record, and re-
warded it. In the Nifty-Fifty days , it had 
a multiple as high as 38. Emerson shares 
have fared better than most of the old 
one-decision growth stocks, thanks in 
good part to continued good earnings 
gains, but now sell for only about 11 
times probable 1978 fiscal year earnings . 
In a market where the Dow industrials 
are priced at an average of eight times 
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earnings this isn't bad, but it isn't J good 
as it used to be, and it hurts Emerson's 
ability to make advantageous acquisi-
tions for stock. Says one analyst: "Emer-
son's PIE has been its most important 
product." 
Here's why: Of 1977 revenues, a full 
45% can be traced to acquisitions made 
in the last ten years. Knight has doubled 
the company's size, making 17 acquisi-
tions since 1973, twice as many as were 
made in the previous five . When you 
make acquisitions with a stock that sells 
for 30 times earnings-as Emerson's 
usually did-you are, in effect, paying 
with money that costs you only 3,3%. 
Thus if you buy a company that is earn-
ing, say, 10% on the purchase price, 
there is no earnings dilution; to the con-
trary, the acquisition immediately en-
hances earnings per share . While the 
decade's acquisitions contribute 45% of 
earnings, they probably received less 
than 20% of Emerson's stock. 
Of course, Knight could change policy 
and begin buying companies for cash. 
Emerson has very little debt-just over 
10% of capitalization-and cash for ac-
quisitions could be borrowed; borrowed 
money is cheap money since the interest 
is a tax deduction . But Knight says he is 
not interested in getting Emerson heav-
ily in.to debt. Not that he's totally against 
cash acquisitions. Knight is willing to go 
into debt up to 15% of capitalization. He 
says, "We could leverage ourselves but 
we don't want to . We already have 
enough investment opportunities to 
meet our growth objective of 12.5%. 
We're never going to be caught in the 
kind of fixed-cost squeeze in which oth-
ers found themselves in 1975. Then 
earnings would drop, and so would our 
multiple . Consistency isn't everything to 
our multiple but it certainly helps ." 
Knight is sensitive about others' per-
ception of how that consistency is ob-
tained. "There's an insinuation we're 
playing with reserves . Well, hell , in 
1975 our reserves at the end of the year 
were higher than at the beginning of the 
year." All of which means that to grow 
Emerson will have to work even harder 
on its core businesses. But there is a 
crucial question that Knight refuses to 
answer: If the core was growing at 7. 9% 
between 1965 and 1975, then how fast is 
it growing today? Fast enough to give 
the company at least 12.5% growth? Cer-
tainly the pressure is on him to do so, 
because as President Larry Keyes ad-
mits, "We're realists and there are some 
companies in which the market dynam-
ics just aren't there-and Superman isn't 
going to get them there." Put it this way: 
Since its multiple has weakened, one of 
the strengths that made Emerson a su-
percompany in the pas t has diminished. 
It still has the other, the internal 
strengths. And under Chuck Knight 
thes·e are scarcely being neglected. · 
While young Chuck Knight is wres-
tling with such problems , Buck Persons 
is having the time of his life. He goes to 
Florida in the winter. He has played all 
the championship golf courses in Scot-
land. He goes to Africa on safari. Occa-
sionally he comes into the office; he's the 
manager of Emerson's pension fund . A 
fortunate man , he did everything right-
right down to his own succession. 
Lester Knight, who did everything 
right but to excess , is still running his 25-
million-a-year consulting firm , one of the 
largest in the world. But he may finally 
have a successor. Lester B. Knight III, 
Chuck Knight's son, is now 19 years old 
and, like his father and granddad before 
him , a student at Cornell. Chuck Knight 
says bluntly, "I have never put the pres-
sure on my son that my father did on 
me. " Still, Lester Knight has his eye on 
his namesake. • 
Inch By Painful Inch 
EMERSON ELECTRic's history dates back 87 years. It sold can be eliminated and material savings which can be made. 
the very first electric fan in the U.S. and for decades it In A.B. Chance's standard-item utility product business , 
remained a leader in that field. But after World War II, there is little chance to raise prices above industry levels 
larger companies like GE and Westinghouse moved in on because products are sold on bid to utility purchasing 
Emerson. By the mid-Fifties , newly appointed chairman agents who always select the lowest price. But a new design 
Buck Persons was caught in the ,.....-------· --------........_..., for its utility pole anchor allows 
classic price-cost squeeze; and Chance to be a stronger competi-
he was losing the battle. tor in that market by passing 
In 1955 to meet his competi- along its cost savings. The new 
tors' cost cuts would have meant anchor, less complicated and less · 
$1.2 million, and higher material bulky, costs 30 cents less to pro-
prices another $800,000. That duce than the original product. 
would have eaten up the previous Alco, acquired in 1969, has 
year's entire profit, just $2 mil- moved into a strong leadership 
lion in 1954. That was the birth of position in the air-.conditioning 
Emerson's now sophisticated and refrigeration valve market. 
cost-savings program . Typically, Alco's refrigeration valve for heat 
Emerson gets those savings inch pumps was recently redesigned 
by inch, yard by yard. to allow for the more efficient 
"We are the low-cost produc- flow of Freon. That added $7 in 
er," brags Knight, "in every value to a valve that sold for $18. 
product we make." Analysts re- Again , Emerson will hold its 
cently have seen a shift: They price and go for market share. 
believe Emerson will sacrifice In Emerson's In-Sink-Erator 
the market share it used to division, its waste disposal unit 
prize to gain profitability. Erner- manufacturer, the company had 
son says that these cost reduc- been buying a starting switch 
tions give it the flexibility to go from a supplier at 31 cents apiece. 
after either market share or · By bringing that part in house, 
profitability. the cost came down to 23 cents, 
How do they get these cost savingover$600,000ayear. Mui-
reductions? One metho<l--<:alled tiply that by well over 3, 000 prod-
value analysis-is a systematic ucts, and you have some idea of 
review of all their products to how Emerson is "saving" $77 mil-
look for unnecessary costs which Gears: A passion for cost~cutting. lion this year. -P.B. 
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Conrail West? 
Government subsidies aren't the only remedy available for sick railroads. 
THE LAST THING the federal government 
needs is another quagmire for money, 
but that seems to be exactly what it has 
in Consolidated Rail Corp., a govern-
ment-backed corporation formed from 
the ruins of the Penn Central and its 
satellites and former competitors. Con-
rail's backers once predicted their cre-
ation would be earning $111 million by 
1979. Instead, Conrail will have used up 
its first $2. l billion in federal money by 
next year and will need another $1 bil-
lion-plus-just as a start. 
What is so sad is that there was an 
alternative to Conrail, a free enterprise 
alternative, but the unions blocked it. 
The trustees of the Penn Central had 
advocated what they called "controlled 
liquidation": selling viable parts of the 
system to neighboring roads and letting 
them do the rebuilding job. At one 
point, two rich railroads, the Southern 
and the Chessie System, even proposed 
buying parts of what became the Conrail 
system and running them themselves. 
Chessie was prepared to spend $500 mil-
lion in rebuilding some 2,000 miles of 
what is now Conrail if it could buy them 
for $55 million. 
In the end the free enterprise solution 
failed because the unions refused to ac-
cept the less permissive work rules that 
prevailed on the Southern and the Ches-
sie. The union preferred dealing with 
government, which could tap taxpayers' 
pockets to support featherbedding. 
The "controlled liquidation" solution 
is probably dead in the East, but it still 
offers a possible way ouf in the Midwest, 
where two big roads have already gone 
broke and more are on the edge. The 
two already bankrupt are the Rock Island 
and the Milwaukee. The Missouri-Kan-
sas-Texas has avoided it only by pure 
luck for years. And last fall the Interstate 
Commerce Commission concluded that 
two other roads-the Chicago & North 
Western and the Illinois Central Gulf-
were headed for financial problems as 
well. Is yet another regional railroad col-
lapse in the making? Will a Conrail-type 
solution-with the government funnel-
ing in as much money as necessaiy to 
keep the railroads going- again be the 
path of least resistance? 
Norfolk & Western President John P. 
Fishwick for one is gloomy about the 
prospects. "From the standpoint of eco-
nomics," he says, "you could have a pri-
vate enterprise solution, but from the 
standpoint of politics I think it's doubtful 
that you will. You've got the pressure 
groups-the shippers, labor, the politi-
cians-saying, 'Why not do the Conrail 
thing for the West?' " 
But Fishwick may be too gloomy. A. 
Daniel O'Neal, chairman of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, said last 
January: "We should avoid the tempta-
tion to start thinking of another Conrail 
of the West or Midwest. " O'Neal main-
tains that the railroads should avail 
themselves of innovative rate-making, 
mergers, consolidations, or the $1.6 bil-
lion in financial aid available under the 
1976 Railroad Rehabilitation & Regula-
tory Reform Act. "A massive govern-
ment bailout," says O'Neal, "is not likely 
to provide a lasting solution and in any 
event probably is not necessary to pre-
serve essential rail services." 
Most businessmen would agree with 
O'Neal: An extension of the Conrail ap-
proach should be avoided if possible. 
The whole idea could be contagious. 
Why not a government-subsidized cor-
poration to run the decrepit steel mills of 
the Midwest? Why not do as Britain does 
and subsidize almost any corporation 
that can' t exist on its own? 
The point is that Conrail and its 
mounting costs-along with those of Am-
trak- may yet be a timely warning to 
Congress and to the bureaucracy to think 
twice before opening the federal purse 
strings to dying businesses. • 
Oiling The Works 
The World Bank is starting to bankroll oil development, but carefully. 
MANY A POOR nation bleeding financially 
to pay for OPEC oil may well be sitting 
on large reserves of its own. A French 
study done for the World Bank found 
that about 70 developing countries prob-
ably possess 60 billion barrels of recover-
able oil even though they have found 
only about 10 billion of them. 
These countries, some of them Marx-
ist and all of them deeply suspicious of 
Western oil companies, have been push-
ing the World Bank to come up with cash 
and advice to help them find this oil. 
Until recently the Bank had been reluc-
tant, saying that its job is to use its 
limited resources for things-like dams 
and highways-that private investors 
would never touch. Now it intends to 
invest $500 million a year in develop-
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ment, but not exploration projects. 
Efrain Friedmann, assistant director of 
the Bank's energy department, explains 
the reasons: "If their legislation covering 
oil exploration is correct, then these 
countries can attract this sort of risk cap-
ital. If a country feels it is not equipped 
to negotiate with an oil company, we 
suggest they hire consultants to help, 
and we may finance this." 
Surprisingly, one of .the current prob-
lems is that the big oil companies don't 
want overly favorable deals because ex-
perience has taught them that these are 
ultimately repudiated . Some countries, 
on the other hand, are so anxious for 
exploration that they will sign almost 
anything. In this situation, the World 
Bank thinks it can help by serving as 
honest broker for both sides. 
Why is the Bank willing to step in at 
the development stage? Some of the 
bank staff were against even this limited 
investing in oil. The ultimate decision 
was that the World Bank should help 
where it could, because successful oil 
development would generate large 
amounts of cash for other, less profitable 
development needs. 
The amount involved, the $500 mil-
lion a year, is peanuts by oil industry 
standards. But with World Bank partici-
pation in development, private capital 
might be more forthcoming; presumably 
a local government that would think 
nothing of confiscating private property 
would think twice about confiscating 
what is in effect World Bank property. • 
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